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HaN. SHARRONE. ANGLE, et ai., Members of the Nevada
State Assembly and Nevada State Senate,
Petitioners,
v.
KENNy GUINN,Governor of the State of Nevada, et al.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF
AND BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL TAXPAYERS
UNION, THE NEVADA MANUFACTURERS
ASSOCIATION, THE HOWARD JARVIS
TAXPA YERS FOUNDATION, AMERICANS FOR
LIMITED GOVERNMENT, AMERICANS FOR TAX
REFORM, THE CLUB FOR GROWTH, NEVADA
CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS,
INC., THE
NEVADA MOTOR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION,
THE NEVADA TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION, THE
RETAIL ASSOCIATION OF NEVADA, AND THE
RENO-SPARKS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, AS
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
PAULE. SALAMANCA

February 20, 2004

Counsel of Record
279 Cassidy Avenue
Lexington, KY 40502
(859) 266-1242
Counsel for Amici Curiae

No. 03·1037
IN THE

~u.prrmr O1nurtnf the lIluitrIl ~ta:tr!i
HaN. SHARRONE. ANGLE, et al., Members of the Nevada
State Assembly and Nevada State Senate,
Petitioners,
v.
KENNy GUINN,Governor of the State of Nevada, et al.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BRIEF
AS AMICI CURIAE'

The National Taxpayers Union, the Nevada Manufacturers
Association, the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Foundation,
Americans for Limited Government, Americans for Tax
Reform, the Club for Growth, Nevada Corporate Headquarters,
Inc., the Nevada Motor Transport Association, the Nevada
Taxpayers Association, the Retail Association of Nevada, and
the Reno-Sparks Chamber of Commerce respectfully move,
pursuant to Rule 37 .2(b) of this Court, for leave to file a brief

I With the exception
of Nevada Corporate Headquarters, Inc.
("NCH"), none of the parties submitting this brief has a parent corporation,
and no publicly held company owns 10 percent or more of any party. NCH
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Superior Capital Corporation, a Nevada
limited partnership. Neither it nor its parent company issues shares to the
public.
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as amici curiae in support of petitioners.
Counsel for
petitioners has granted consent to file this brief. Counsel for
respondents have not granted consent.
The foregoing groups represent taxpayers and businesses
whose interests are put in jeopardy by the decision of the
Supreme Court of Nevada in this case. When public officials
transgress the structural limits on their authority, particularly
with respect to taxation and appropriation, they undermine the
concept of a "Republican Form of Government" guaranteed by
Article IV, § 4, of the Constitution.
Such transgressions
threaten the economic and political interests of people who care
deeply about, and are seriously affected by, the way
government collects and spends money.
The interests ofthe groups making this motion fall into two
distinct areas. The first is protection of taxpayers from
governmental indifference or hostility to their interests, often
attributable to rent-seeking behavior involving political factions
and public officials. The second is protection of vulnerable
political constituencies from onerous, targeted taxes that are
rendered more feasible by the abandonment of super-majority
requirements. These groups note with dismay the cavalier
decision of the Supreme Court of Nevada to disregard an
important structural restraint put in place by the voters of
Nevada to prevent the adoption of new taxes without the
support of a super-majority of the legislature.
The National Taxpayers Union is considered the nation's
oldest organization representing individual taxpayers. One of
its key goals is adoption of constitutional limitations on the
power of government at all levels to impose taxes and incur
debt. A non-profit, civic organization founded in 1969, it
represents over 350,000 members in aliSO states. Its members
played important roles in the passage of the Nevada measure
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and similar limitations in other states, and it submitted briefs
amicus curiae to this Court in support of the petitions in
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995), and Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n of Webster County,
West Virginia, 488 U.S. 336 (1989), both of which this Court
accepted for review.
The Nevada Manufacturers Association ("NMA") is a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of Nevada. Its
mission is to protect and support the manufacturing companies
in Nevada. NMA has close to 400 members, with membership
varying from the largest manufacturing company in Nevada to
some with one or two employees. NMA was the lead signatory
to a brief amicus curiae submitted to the Supreme Court of
Nevada in the instant litigation.
The Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Foundation ("HJTF") is a
non-profit charitable foundation devoted to economic
education, the study of tax policy, and defending the interests
of taxpayers in the courts. In support of its activities, HJTF has
also sponsored numerous studies and fora on the subject of
taxation and public spending.
Americans for Limited Government ("ALG") is a nonprofit civic organization that advocates policies on the state and
federal level that seek to reduce governmental spending and
regulation. ALG also supports efforts to increase judicial
accountability and reinstatement of the Tenth Amendment's
policy of enumerated powers. ALG opposed the tax increase
referendum in Alabama in 2003 and the referenda in Oregon in
January 2003 and February 2004.
Americans for Tax Reform is a non-profit organization that
serves as a national clearinghouse for the grassroots taxpayers'
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movement by working with approximately 800 groups at the
state and county level.
The Club for Growth is a nationwide political membership
organization dedicated to advancing public policies that
promote economic growth. It represents over 15,000 members
in alISO states.
Nevada Corporate Headquarters, Inc., is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Superior Capital Corporation, a Nevada limited
partnership. It participated as amicus curiae in the proceedings
in the Supreme Court of Nevada below.
The Nevada Motor Transport Association is a nonprofit
association devoted to promoting the interests of the motor
carrier industry. It currently has 317 members.
The Nevada Taxpayers Association ("NT A") is a nonpartisan, non-profit membership association serving the citizens
of Nevada since 1922 by advocating for responsible
government at a reasonable price. NT A provides research on
fiscal issues to policy makers and the public, and has been
recognized by the Legislature of Nevada and by Governors of
the State for its unbiased research. NTA has approximately
800 members statewide, including individuals, businesses of all
sizes and forms of organization, and public agencies at both the
state and local level. NT A has submitted briefs amicus curiae
in a variety of cases involving taxation and the imposition of
fees, including the instant litigation.
The Retail Association of Nevada advocates for many of
the major retailers and a large portion of the small retailers in
the state on issues involving state and local government. It has
700 members within the state. One of its main goals is to keep
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Nevada a business friendly state. It has taken part in previous
litigation involving a proposed tax on business income.
The Reno-Sparks Chamber of Commerce ("RSCC") is a
non-profit organization that represents the regional and
business community in the Reno/Sparks/Tahoe area. It has
2,100 members.
No party would suffer undue prejudice were the Court to
accept this brief for filing.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL E. SALAMANCA

February 20, 2004

Counsel of Record
279 Cassidy Avenue
Lexington, KY 40502
(859) 266-1242
Counsel for Amici Curiae

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether a state supreme court's abrogation of a
structural constitutional rule governing the enactment of
legislation, pursuant to a rationale that would just as readily call
for the abrogation of any similar rule, violates the Guarantee
Clause of the federal Constitution.
2. Whether a state supreme court's abrogation of a
structural constitutional rule governing the levying of taxes
violates the Guarantee Clause of the federal Constitution by
essentially transferring the power of the purse to the judiciary.
3. Whether, in circumstances where a state supreme court
has definitively abrogated a key structural provision of a state
Constitution, no other branch of the federal government has
spoken to the issue, and a judicial remedy is clearly available,
this Court should resolve a case arising under the Guarantee
Clause on the merits.
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STATEMENT OF INTEREST!
As explained in the foregoing motion for leave to file a
brief as amici curiae, the groups submitting this brief have a
direct and substantial interest in this case. Separation of powers
and the various structural restraints on public officials
established by our constitutional system - including such
restraints as super-majority requirements for new taxes - are
the most effective defense against arbitrary government and
selective, adverse legislation. When government ignores these
restraints, or indeed is ordered to do so by the very judiciary
that is supposed to enforce such restraints, taxpayers,
businesses, and the citizenry as a whole are vulnerable.
The various groups submitting this brief have been active,
and indeed have often taken the forefront, in protecting the
interests of taxpayers and merchants in the political and legal
arena. They have promoted a variety of provisions along the
lines of the super-majority rule at issue in this case, and they
have participated as amici in a range of litigation implicating
the rights of taxpayers and the commercial sector. In fact, the
Nevada Manufacturers Association, the Nevada Taxpayers
Association, the Retail Association of Nevada, Nevada
Corporate Headquarters, Inc., and the Nevada Motor Transport
Association all participated as amici below, and two of the
amici, the Nevada Manufacturers Association and the Retail
Association of Nevada, were parties in the parallel federal
action, Angle v. Legislature of Nevada, 274F.Supp.2d 1152 (D.
Nev. 2003).

I No counsel for a party wrote this brief in whole or in part, nor did
any person or entity, other than amici, their affiliates, or their counsel, make
a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The decision of the Supreme Court of Nevada at issue in
this petition derogates radically from the principle of
government by consent. In ordering Nevada's legislators to
disregard an important constitutional and structural restraint on
the adoption of new taxes, specifically, the requirement of a
two-thirds majority in each house to pass any such measure, the
Supreme Court of Nevada rendered every such restraint
vulnerable to judicial override. Not only does this leave
economic and political minorities vulnerable to targeted taxes,
but it also fundamentally deviates from the concept of a
"Republican Form of Government" guaranteed by Article N,
§ 4, of the federal Constitution. Although this Court has tended
to avoid deciding cases on the basis of the Guarantee Clause,
nothing in the nature of this clause necessitates its desuetude,
and the instant case is apt for its reinvigoration.
In addition, the decision of the Supreme Court of Nevada
undermines separation of powers to such a profound degree that
it violates the Guarantee Clause. Inissuing a writ of mandamus
against the state's legislators, and in ordering them to
appropriate funds and raise taxes without regard to
constitutional restraints to which they are subject, the Supreme
Court of Nevada essentially re-allocated the power of the purse
from the legislature to the judiciary. Although the states are
generally free to divide power among the branches of
government as they see fit, few if any concepts are more firmly
grounded in the republican tradition than the idea that the
legislature controls the purse strings.
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Finally, there is nothing in the nature of the Guarantee
Clause that renders it categorically unfit for judicial application.
Although specific disputes arising under the clause may prove
non-justiciable, the clause is nevertheless susceptible of judicial
application in the proper circumstances. As Justice Brennan
observed in his opinion for this Court in Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186,210-11 (1962), "[m]uch confusion results from the
capacity of the 'political question' label to obscure the need for
case-by-case inquiry." The instant case presents none of the
indicia of non-justiciability identified by Justice Brennan in
Baker. No provision of the Constitution vests responsibility to
apply the Guarantee Clause solely in a branch of the federal
government other than the courts; no other branch of the federal
government has even purported to address the issues presented;
and, because of the clear incompatibility of the Supreme Court
of Nevada's decision with the principles of government by
consent, this Court is fully capable of determining whether its
decision can stand. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
REASONS FOR GRANTING
I.

THE WRIT

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA'S DECISION
LEAVES ALL STRUCTURAL
RESTRAINTS
ON
THE LAWMAKING PROCESS VULNERABLE TO
JUDICIAL OVERRIDE.

Article IV, § 4, of the Constitution provides that "[tjhe
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government." Although this Court has
been reluctant to apply the Guarantee Clause to cases presented
to it for review, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,209 (1962),
nothing in the nature of the clause necessitates rendering it a
dead letter so far as the judiciary is concerned. In fact, only
twelve years ago, in New York v. United States, Justice
O'Connor took note of continued support for reinvigoration of
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the clause, and recognized such reinvigoration as presenting a
"difficult" issue that awaits resolution. 505 U.S. 144, 185
(l992).
Since then, a number of lower federal courts have
contemplated the resolution of disputes arising under the
Guarantee Clause on the merits, although none has actually
predicated a decision on that ground. See, e.g., Texas v. United
States, 106 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997); Kelley v. United
States, 69 F.3d 1503, 1510-11 (lOth Cir. 1995). Amici
respectfully submit that no case would be more apt for
reinvigoration of the Guarantee Clause than the instant one.
Enforcement of the clause in such a clear and egregious
example of derogation from the principles of a "Republican
Form of Government" as this would prove salutary for the
states and for the nation as a whole,"
The history of the founding era indicates quite strongly that
one of the principal concerns underlying the Guarantee Clause
was fear that a non-republican form of government, taking hold
in one state, might cause other states to follow suit, and in time
threaten the entire nation. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 43
(James Madison). Although this may sound far-fetched to
modern ears, it actually reflects great foresight. Not long after
the Supreme Court of Nevada announced its decision in this
case, public officials in California expressed an intention to
seek similar relief from the courts of that state. See, e.g., Evan
Halper & Gregg Jones, The State; Official to Sue Over Budget
Impasse, L.A. Times, July 17, 2003, at B6 ("A spokesman for
Supt. Jack O'Connell said Wednesday that officials would use
an argument similar to one that recently led the Nevada
Supreme Court to grant Republican Gov. Kenny Guinn's
request to intervene in that state's budget debate."). And the
decision in Nevada may have ramifications in Arkansas as well.
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For further analysis on this point, see Part III, infra.
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See David Robinson, Court To Appoint Special Master, Fort
Smith Times Record, Jan. 23, 2004, available
at
http://www.swtimes.comlarchiveI2004/JanuaryI23/news/spe
cial_master.htrnl (discussing prolonged litigation over funding
for schools in Arkansas) ("[The] Justices noted that in Nevada,
to break an impasse on taxes to support education, the high
court ordered that the Legislature there ignore a constitutional
provision requiring a two-thirds vote and pass the taxes with a
simple majority.").
It is true, of course, that the framers of the Guarantee Clause
were most notably anxious about violent takeovers, as is
evidenced by the other clauses in Arti~le N, § 4,3 but they did
not limit their attention to such possibilities. As commentator
Arthur Bonfield noted in an article that this Court has cited, the
goal of those who wrote and ratified the Guarantee Clause was
to "prevent the creation by any means, whether peaceful or
otherwise, of aristocratic, monarchial, or despotic state
governments."
Arthur Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of
Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46
Minn. L. Rev. 513, 522 (1962). See New York, 505 U.S. at 183
(citing Bonfield).
The essence of republican government is government by
consent. This consent has two distinct aspects - that public
officials should be chosen by the people, and that these
individuals, once in office, should be subject to the rule oflaw.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 223 nA8 (quoting In re Duncan,
139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891)). Any gross deviation from these
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This Section provides in full that: "The United States shall

guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican

Form of Government,

and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature,

or of the Executive

against domestic Violence."

(when the Legislature

U.S. Const. art. N, § 4.

cannot be convened)
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principles implicates the Guarantee Clause. Although the
decision of the Supreme Court of Nevada does not prevent the
people of the state from choosing their leaders, it does derogate
radically from the rule of law, and on this ground is properly
subject to review under the clause. Specifically, the decision of
the Supreme Court of Nevada eviscerates a structural restraint
imposed by the people of Nevada on their legislature without a
coherent rationale grounded in text or precedent.
Although a super-majority requirement for new taxes is
quite common,' it is not a universal rule, and therefore cannot
itself be considered part of the irreducible minimum of a
republican form of government.
But this Court must not
mistake a specific application of the Supreme Court of
Nevada's reasoning for the reasoning itself. If allowed to stand,
that Court's decision would justify the overriding of any
number of so-called "procedural" rules that regulate the
lawmaking process, notwithstanding their relationship to the
principle of government by consent.
The Supreme Court of Nevada did not make the point
explicitly, but in arriving upon its decision it necessarily took
the position that the appropriate remedy in a case such as this
takes its cue from the circumstances presented. Thus, if a bare
majority of the members of each house of the legislature were
willing to approve new taxes, the so-called "procedural" rule
requiring a two-thirds majority to adopt new taxes would have

4 The Constitutions of at least ten states require a super-majority
vote in the legislature to levy new taxes. See Ariz. Const. art. IX, § 22 (twothirds); Ark. Const. art. V, § 38 (three-fourths); Cal. Const. art. XIIlA, § 3
(two-thirds), Del. Const. art. VIII, § 10, cl. a (three-fifths); La. Const. art.
VII, Pt. 1, § 2 (two-thirds); Miss. Const. art. IV, § 70 (three-fifths); Nev.
Const. art. IV, § 18, cl. 2 (two-thirds); Okla. Const. art. V, § 33 (threefourths); Or. Const. art. IV, § 25 (two-thirds); S.D. Const. art. XI, § 14 (twothirds).
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to give way. See Guinn v. Legislature of Nevada, 71 P.3d
1269, 1275, reh'g denied and opinion clarified, 76 P.3d 22
(Nev. 2003). But, under the Supreme Court of Nevada's
reasoning, what exactly would render this procedural rule
uniquely vulnerable to override? What if two-thirds of the
members of the Assembly were willing to adopt new taxes, but
only one-third ofthe members of the Senate? By the Supreme
Court of Nevada's logic, the state's requirement
of
bicameralism, see Nev. Const. art. IV, § 18, cl. I, itself merely
"procedural," would need to give way, notwithstanding this
Court's recognition in INS v. Chadha that bicameralism is one
of the most important structural safeguards in the lawmaking
system. See 462 U.S. 919, 948 (1983) ("The bicameral
requirement ... was of scarcely less concern to the Framers
than was the Presidential veto and indeed the two concepts are
interdependent."); id. at 951 ("The division of the Congress into
two distinctive bodies assures that the legislative power would
be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in
separate settings."). See also I Montesquieu, The Spirit of the
Laws, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 159 (1823) ("The legislative body being
composed of two parts, they check one another by the mutual
privilege of rejecting.").
Similarly, what if two-thirds of the members of each
chamber were willing to adopt new taxes, but the Governor
were opposed?
Why would Nevada's requirement of
presentment, see Nev. Const. art. IV, § 35, survive analysis,
whereas the merely "procedural" requirement of a supermajority would not?
Indeed, none of the provisions of
Nevada's Constitution that governs the lawmaking process
would be immune from the Supreme Court of Nevada' s protean
standard. This approach may be consistent with abstract
notions of equity, but it is radically inconsistent with the notion
of government by consent and government by the rule of law.
Cf Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,127-28 (1995) (Thomas,
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J., concurring) ("If their remedial discretion had not been
cabined, Blackstone warned, equity courts would have
undermined the rule of law and produced arbitrary
government."). For this reason, this Court should grant the writ
and review the decision below.

II. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA'S DECISION
EFFECTS A RADICAL AND DANGEROUS REALLOCATION OF POWER WITH RESPECT TO
TAXATION AND APPROPRIATION.
As this Court has noted, nothing compels the states to
separate powers among the three branches of government in
precisely the same manner as these branches are separated at
the federal level. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902).
Without doubt, states retain extraordinary power to re-allocate
power within their constitutional systems. But surely this
observation cannot be taken so far as to permit such wholesale
re-allocation of power as would make a mockery of the concept
of government by divided power. As this Court has observed,
the concept of a "republican form of government" does have
some content, with principle reference to the role of the
legislature:
By the Constitution, a republican form of
government is guaranteed to every State of the Union,
and the distinguishing feature of that form is the right of
the people to choose their own officers for
governmental administration, and pass their own laws
in virtue of the legislative power reposed in
representative bodies, whose legitimate acts may be
said to be those of the people themselves.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 223 nA8 (1962) (quoting In re
Duncan, 139U.S.449,461 (1891)(emphasisadded».
Seealso
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The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison) ("In republican
government,
the legislative
authority
necessarily
predominates.") .
Among the prerogatives of the legislature, none is more
firmly grounded in republican tradition than the power of the
purse. Like the federal Constitution, the constitution of almost
every state contains a provision expressly reserving the power
of the purse to the legislature. For example, Article IV, § 19,
of the Nevada Constitution provides that "[n]o money shall be
drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations
made by law." This is almost identical to Article I, § 9, clause
7, ofthe federal Constitution, which provides that "[n]o Money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by law." This allocation of authority is
one of the essences of representative government. See 4 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 16, 19-20 (1980) (describing the goal that
"Congress will determine for what purposes the government's
money is to be spent and how much for each purpose" as
"elementary to a proper distribution of governmental powers").
Indeed, this allocation reflects one of the rallying cries for the
American Revolution - "No taxation without representation."
This allocation finds strong roots in both history and
practical experience. As a historical matter, only religion can
account more fully for the English Civil War of the Seventeenth
Century than the struggle between Parliament and the Crown
over the power of the purse. Whereas England entered that
century with a relatively high degree of prerogative vested in
the Crown, and with a relatively limited power lying in
Parliament either to pay for the Crown's activities or to resist
paying for them, by the end of that century Parliament had
converted this power into a general authority to direct the
affairs of government through control of the purse. As one
commentator has aptly noted:
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The evolution of British representative democracy and
the power of the purse are inextricably intertwined.
English monarchs traditionally used Parliament as a
means of raising revenues, usually to finance their
military adventures.
Over the centuries, British
Parliaments began to use this revenue-raising authority
to exact legislative concessions from the Crown,
threatening to withhold funds if their demands were not
met. Parliamentary insistence on a voice in governing
the nation inevitably lead to struggle with the
monarchy, which was not eager to surrender its royal
prerogatives. The struggle came to a head during the
reign of the Stuart kings in the 17th century. By the end
of the century, the nation had suffered a protracted civil
war, one king had lost his head, another had been
deposed in a bloodless coup, and the supremacy of
Parliament had been established. By the time of the
American Revolution, Parliament's dominance over the
British public fisc was complete.
R. Rosen, Funding "Non- TraditionalMilitary

Operations: The
Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 Mil.
L. Rev. I, 28-29 (1998). Similar conclusions can be drawn
from the French Revolution. See Simon Schama, Citizens: A
Chronicle of the French Revolution 289-90 (1989).
The allocation of the purse strings to the legislature also
makes profound sense as a matter of practical politics.
Although the people elect their governors, no branch of the
government is more fully representative of the people, and more
fully authorized to spend their money, than the legislature. The
legislature reconstitutes the polity in its variety of backgrounds
and experiences. Unlike executive officials, legislators are not
subject to reporting relationships, nor do they have limited
portfolios in any formal sense of the phrase. Instead, they have
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a direct, inalienable right to deliberate over the full range of
issues presented for resolution, and to cast their vote
accordingly.
To be sure, the people of Nevada have chosen to complicate
their legislative process by imposing a two-thirds requirement
for the levying of new taxes. But this Court should be loathe to
identify such a requirement as a stranger to republican
government. In fact, many of the rules governing the legislative
process are designed to make that process more deliberative and
thereby to protect vulnerable minorities and produce more
pleasing results. As James Madison explained in Federalist No.
51:
In republican government, the legislative authority
necessarily predominates.
The remedy for this
inconveniency is, to divide the legislature into different
branches; and to render them, by different modes of
election, and different principles of action, as little
connected with each other, as the nature of their
common functions, and their common dependence on
the society, will admit.
Nevada's super-majority requirement for new taxes is nothing
more than a variation on this theme. Most notably, such a
requirement protects vulnerable economic constituencies from
targeted taxes. The people of Nevada may reasonably have
concluded that it was altogether too easy for a simple majority
of the two chambers of the legislature to impose taxes on select
economic minorities, whereas concurrent super-majorities to
impose the same taxes would not readily exist. By ordering the
legislature of Nevada to disregard the state's super-majority
requirement for new taxes, the Supreme Court of Nevada
derogated radically and dangerously from the principle of
popular control, through the legislature, over the purse.
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It is true, of course, that the Constitution of Nevada contains
a provision requiring the legislature to provide for public
schools. See Nev. Const, art. XI, § 2 ("The legislature shall
provide for a uniform system of common schools, by which a
school shall be established and maintained in each school
district at least six months in every year."). It is also true that
the Supreme Court of Nevada, in issuing the decision that is the
subject of the petition, purported to be enforcing this provision.
See Guinn, 71 P 3d at 1275. But, in reading this provision as an
essentially self-executing funding mechanism, with content to
be judicially inferred, the Supreme Court of Nevada crossed the
line between interpreting an organic legal document and
governing without the consent of the population.'
As this Court is no doubt well aware, the constitutions of
more than half the states require the legislatures thereof to
provide for some support for education, often without
elaborating on this abstract duty. The question then arises,
whether courts could construe these provisions as a source of
authority for the judiciary to impose taxes or appropriate funds,
were the legislature not to act, without fatally undermining
separation of powers. This is a profoundly difficult question,
and one that would obviously call for delicate consideration,
and strictly political resolution, if at all possible. As Justice
Frankfurter observed in the somewhat similar circumstances of
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer:
Rigorous adherence to the narrow scope of the judicial
function is especially demanded in controversies that

5 In this regard, it must be noted that the people of Nevada have
also chosen to retain at least some degree of sovereign immunity in their
Constitution. See Nev. Const. art. IV, § 22 ("Provision may be made by
general law for bringing suit against the State as to all liabilities originating
after the adoption of this Constitution.").
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arouse appeals to the Constitution. The attitude with
which this Court must approach its duty when
confronted with such issues is precisely the opposite of
that normally manifested by the general public. Socalled constitutional questions seem to exercise a
mesmeric influence over the popular mind. This
eagerness to settle - preferably forever - a specific
problem on the basis of the broadest possible
constitutional pronouncements may not unfairly be
called one of our minor national traits.
343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See
also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986)( commenting
on separation of powers at the federal level) ("That this system
... produces conflicts, confusion, and discordance at times is
inherent, but it was deliberately so structured to assure full,
vigorous, and open debate on the great issues affecting the
people .... "); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)
("Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectivesor the hallmarks - of democratic government .... ").
In the decision that is the subject of this petition, the
Supreme Court of Nevada seems to have made precisely the
error identified by Justice Frankfurter in Youngstown. Instead
of approaching the difficult issues of separation of powers,
responsibility for the fiscal affairs of government, and the
proper scope of sovereign immunity with the delicacy required
by the situation, that Court seized upon one of the most
extraordinary forms of relief available - a mandamus against
the legislature, requiring it to levy new taxes without regard to
specific constitutional restraints on the lawmaking process.
Without doubt, the concept of a "Republican Form of
Government" and government by divided power does not
contemplate that such difficult situations as those presented in
this case will be short-circuited by the judiciary. As Justice
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Maupin noted in his separate opinion in the instant case, the
doctrine of separation of powers stands - or ought to stand as an "impediment" to immediate judicial resolution of a case
such as this. See Guinn v. Legislature of Nevada, 71 P.3d at
1277 (Maupin, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). As
Justice Maupin aptly observed, "[c]ertainly, the specifics of
creating a budget fall within the discretion of the Legislature."
[d. at 1278 (Maupin, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
III.

THIS CASE IS FULLY JUSTICIABLE.

Reports of the non-justiciability of disputes arising under
the Guarantee Clause are greatly exaggerated, and certainly
merit clarification from this Court. Nothing in the nature of the
clause requires such treatment.
It is not, for example, a
"textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an]
issue to a coordinate political department." Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. at 217. Indeed, the clause commits responsibility for the
guarantee to the United States as a whole, which includes the
courts. As Justice O'Connor recently indicated in her opinion
for the Court in New York v. United States, there is merit in
considering judicial application of the clause if circumstances
will permit. See 505 U.S. at 184-85. Amici respectfully submit
that such circumstances are presented here, in an egregious and
patent violation of the principles of government by consent.
In fact, no case better illustrates the potential susceptibility
of disputes arising under the Guarantee Clause to resolution on
the merits than Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I (1849),
the precedent commonly cited for the proposition that cases
arising under the Guarantee Clause are non-justiciable.
In
Luther, this Court refused to decide which of two competing
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governments was the lawful government of Rhode Island after
the so-called "Dorr's Rebellion." Subsequent decisions of this
Court seemed to assume that Luther exposed an inherent nonjusticiability in the clause, see, e.g., Pacific States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Oregon 223 U.S. 118, 142-3, 151 (1912), but in fact the
decision in Luther turned quite simply on commonplace notions
as to the limits of the judicial function.
For example, by the time the case arrived to the Court, the
President had already exercised power vested in him by
Congress to make the militia ready to restore order in the state
if such a step proved necessary. See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
at 43-44. The case also presented the courts with an evidentiary
nightmare. Although it was technically an action for trespass,
had the federal courts addressed the case on the merits, they
would ultimately have had to decide whether the voters of
Rhode Island had lawfully established a new government by
constitutional convention. In a lengthy analysis, Chief Justice
Taney explained that a court of the United States would not
have been competent to judge the qualifications of every voter
in the state and to ascertain whether the voters had lawfully
adopted a new constitution and government. See id. at 41-42.
Given this state of affairs, the Court's decision to avoid
deciding Luther on the merits was an unexceptional application
of the multi-factored test for non-justiciable political questions
articulated by Justice Brennan in Baker. See 369 U.S. at 217.
Because Congress and the President had acted, it was no longer
possible for this Court to resolve the case "without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government." [d.
Similarly, given the steps the President had taken to resolve the
situation, there arose "an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made," as well as a
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"potentiality
of embarrassment
from
multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question." [d. 6
Finally, given the specific issues the case would have presented,
the Court might also have discerned a "lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards forresolving it," id.,especially at that time.
As Justice Brennan aptly noted in Baker, 369 U.S. 186, this
Court's approach to the subject of non-justiciable political
questions is not categorical, but instead is driven by the
circumstances of the cases presented for review. As he
concluded in that opinion after considering the subject at
length, "[tjhe cases we have reviewed show the necessity for
discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and posture of the
particular case, and the impossibility of resolution by any
semantic cataloguing." [d. at 217.
The Guarantee Clause is susceptible of judicial application
in the appropriate case, and no case could be farther from the
posture of Luther v. Borden than the instant one. Whereas, in
Luther, Congress had already passed pertinent legislation and
the President had already acted, in this case no other branch of
the federal government has even purported to resolve the issues
presented. Thus, there is no potential for "expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government," nor is
there "an usual need for unquestioning adherence to a political

6 It also bears notice that the issue of which of RhodeIsland's
two
governments was lawful is conceptually similar to the issue of whether to
recognize a foreign government as legitimate, or whether to recognize a
particular group of Native Americans as a tribe, both of which Justice
Brennan identified as political questions in his opinion for the Court in
Baker. See 369 U.S. at 212, 215.
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decision already made," or the "potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements" on the issues presented.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
Finally, this Court has ample "judicially discoverable and
manageable standards" for resolving this case. [d. The
decision of the Supreme Court of Nevada that is the subject of
this petition speaks for itself, and its incompatibility with the
principles of government by consent is patent. If no structural
rule governing the operation of the legislature of Nevada can
stand up to the reasoning of that decision, and if that decision
essentially transfers the power of the purse to the judiciary, then
the decision radically and demonstrably deviates from the
concept of a "Republican Form of Government." This Court is
fully competent to review the decision of the Supreme Court of
Nevada, and to require a resolution of the case in a manner not
inconsistent with the Guarantee Clause.

CONCLUSION
This Court should grant the writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
PAULE.
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